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The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program imposes strong work restrictions on 
beneficiaries; however, the causal effect of the work disincentives on labor supply has been 
difficult to estimate. We take a new look at this question by exploiting the fact that DI benefits 
are payable only until full retirement age (FRA), at which point they are converted to retired 
worker benefits, and the program’s implicit high marginal tax rate on earnings is abruptly 
relaxed. Using a quasiexperimental research design, we examine whether the DI work 
disincentives are binding by comparing changes in labor force participation rates before and after 
the FRA for DI beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. We find a relative increase in labor force 
participation at FRA for DI beneficiaries of 10.4 percentage points, and argue that this is likely a 
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 I. Introduction  
Extensive research effort has been devoted to understanding the labor supply effects of 
social insurance programs, especially in light of the historical decline in male labor force 
participation.  In particular, the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has attracted 
the attention of policymakers and researchers alike, as it has grown dramatically since inception, 
and features a particularly strong work disincentive:  an implicit 100,000 percent marginal tax 
rate on earnings above a threshold deemed to represent “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) 
($940/month in 2008).  Indeed, the decline in male labor force participation has been attributed 
at least in part to DI (Bound and Waidmann 1992; 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003).  Over the last 
two decades, the DI caseload has shifted from one characterized by individuals with circulatory, 
neoplasms and infectious diseases to one dominated by individuals with mental and 
musculoskeletal impairment.
1 This compositional shift has renewed interest in the work 
disincentives associated with the DI program and has increased the possibility that some form of 
work might be possible for some DI recipients.  
Nevertheless, the causal effect of DI on labor supply is difficult to estimate since all U.S. 
workers face the same benefit schedule.  As a result, observed variation in benefits is due mainly 
to past earnings, which may be correlated with unobserved health status or tastes for work. 
Lacking either exogenous variation in program generosity or a means of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, only a handful of studies have succeeded in obtaining credible 
estimates of the effect of DI on labor supply (e.g., Bound 1989, Bound and Waidmann 1992; 
Gruber and Kubik 1997; Gruber 2000; Autor and Duggan 2003; Chen and van der Klaauw 
                                                 
1 See Trends in the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income Disability Programs (released by the Social 
Security Administration in 2006), pp. 44.  
  22008), and even these have come to different conclusions about the magnitude of the work 
disincentive effects of DI.  
We take a new look at this question by exploiting a little-studied interaction between DI 
and the Social Security retirement program, and a recent policy change that changed the nature 
of the program interaction.  Specifically, DI benefits are payable to eligible individuals until they 
reach their full retirement age, at which point DI benefits automatically convert to retired worker 
benefits under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program.  While the terms 
governing the benefit amount change, the benefit amount itself remains unchanged.  Thus, since 
they are no longer subject to the strict DI work rules, the implicit tax on earnings is abruptly 
relaxed at exactly full retirement age.  Moreover, the extent to which the implicit tax is relaxed 
has varied over time owing to the year 2000 elimination of the Social Security earnings test after 
the full retirement age.  Prior to 2000, DI participants attaining full retirement age faced a 
reduction in the implicit marginal tax rate from approximately 100,000 percent to 50 percent (on 
an even higher exempt amount), the implicit tax rate imposed by the OASI earnings test at full 
retirement age.  In 2000, the earnings test at the full retirement age was eliminated, and thus DI 
participants attaining full retirement age in 2000 or later experienced complete elimination of the 
implicit tax at full retirement age.  If the work disincentive is binding on DI participants, then we 
would expect to observe an increase in labor supply at full retirement age.  
We use a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the labor supply disincentive 
effect of DI.  Specifically, using the Health and Retirement Study (1992-2006) we contrast the 
within-individual change in labor supply at full retirement age for DI beneficiaries versus non-
beneficiaries.  Besides using within-individual changes to difference out unobserved 
heterogeneity, we make use of the longitudinal aspect of the HRS to control for 
  3contemporaneous changes in other factors such as non-labor income, wealth, health, and health 
insurance coverage.  The natural experiment we examine offers direct insight into the potential 
effects of a current policy proposal termed the “$1 for $2 benefit offset,” which would reduce the 
current 100,000 percent implicit marginal tax rate to 50 percent. Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and 
Rust (2006) use a structural model to simulate the effect of implementing such a policy and 
predict large increases in labor force participation among DI beneficiaries. 
The literature to date has sought to establish an upper bound on the work capacity of DI 
participants.  Bound (1989) studied the subsequent labor supply of rejected DI applicants (who 
should have been in marginally better health on average than accepted applicants) and concluded 
that labor force participation among 55-64 year-old men in the absence of the program would 
have been no greater than 34 percent in the 1970s.  Chen and van der Klauuw (2008) use 
Bound’s approach as well as age-based discontinuities in the eligibility determination formula to 
estimate the program’s impact on labor supply (of both men and women) and conclude that labor 
force participation in the 1990s would have been at most 20 percentage points higher in the 
absence of the program. 
  Our approach complements these findings in that it identifies a lower bound on the 
potential work capacity of DI beneficiaries.  By examining changes in labor force participation 
as the oldest DI beneficiaries age out of the program, we examine a subpopulation of DI 
beneficiaries who are perhaps least likely to exhibit a labor supply response to changes in work 
incentives.
2  Indeed, the dominant trend in labor supply at full retirement age is downward.  Any 
increase in labor force participation among this group serves as strong evidence of the existence 
of residual work capacity among DI recipients.  Its magnitude is an indicator of the minimum 
                                                 
2 Individuals between age 60 and FRA represent about one-fifth to one-quarter of the DI caseload during the period 
we study 1992-2006 (Social Security Administration, 2008). 
  4work capacity of DI beneficiaries because the disabled elderly are likely to be in worse health 
than the younger disabled and employment opportunities for even the non-disabled elderly are 
limited (see Maestas and Li ( 2006) for recent evidence).  
Our difference-in-difference (DD) estimates imply a modest 10.4 percentage point rise in 
labor force participation at full retirement age among former DI participants relative to non-DI 
participants.  There is some evidence that the labor supply response was stronger after 
elimination of the Social Security earnings test, suggesting a dose-response relationship between 
the size of the work disincentive and labor supply.  Combining our estimates with Chen and van 
der Klauuw’s (2008) upper bound estimate of 20 percentage points would suggest that the DI 
program causes a modest 10-20 percentage point reduction in labor force participation among 
beneficiaries.   
2.  Institutional Background 
2.1 The DI Program 
 
The U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance program, instituted in 1956, was designed 
to provide income replacement to workers who were deemed permanently, and totally disabled.  
Individuals are entitled to benefits if they have worked in covered employment for five of the 
past ten years.  Unlike disability systems in many other countries, it is not a temporary disability 
system, nor does it prorate benefits for partial disabilities.
3  Consequently, the system operates 
from an underlying presumption that DI recipients are unable to work.  Applicants must 
demonstrate that they did not work during the five months prior to initial application, and once 
they begin receiving benefits they are prohibited from earning more than the threshold defining 
substantial gainful activity (SGA) ($940 per month in 2008).  Since 1960, DI recipients have 
                                                 
3 In many OECD countries, the public contributory disability system awards prorated disability benefits to those 
deemed partially disabled. See Yin (2008) for a detailed comparison of full and partial disability benefit systems. 
  5been permitted to “test” their ability to work during a Trial Work Period.  During the Trial Work 
Period, which begins in the first month of program participation and extends for five years, 
benefits are maintained until the beneficiary accumulates nine months of work above the SGA 
threshold.
4  In the tenth month, for the first $1 of earnings above this threshold, benefits are 
terminated.  For the average DI beneficiary receiving a monthly benefit of $1053 in 2007, this 
amounts to a staggering 100,000 percent implicit marginal tax rate on earnings.
5  Since 1980, 
those who have had their benefits terminated for substantial gainful activity can reinstate benefits 
(without a new application, waiting period, or disability determination) during a three-year 
period (called the Extended Period of Eligibility) after the Trial Work Period in the event they 
stop working and are still disabled. 
Figure 1 illustrates the implied DI budget constraint (ABCDE) for an individual after 
nine accumulated work months during the Trial Work Period, or in the first month of work after 
the Trial Work Period has ended.  The segment AB equals the DI benefit received by a non-
worker who has applied and been accepted by the DI program.
6  As long as earnings are below 
the SGA threshold, a DI recipient may keep her disability benefits;
7 this is illustrated by the 
segment BC, the slope of which in absolute value equals the hourly wage rate.  However, once 
hours of work cause earnings to exceed the SGA limit, benefits are terminated, as reflected by 
the notch CD, which equals the length of AB.  This notch reflects the high implicit marginal tax 
rate on earnings.  The indifference curves superimposed on the budget constraint illustrate how 
an individual who in the absence of the program might work hours>HSGA, would in the presence 
                                                 
4 Until 1992, the nine months had to be consecutive. 
5 This contrasts with implicit tax rates in other social programs, like TANF which range from 6 percent to 30 percent 
(Coe et al., 1998). 
6 We do not consider the probability of being eligible for DI benefits because our focus is on “exit” from the 
program. The budget constraint with acceptance uncertainty has been illustrated by Halpern and Hausman (1986).  
7 Since 2001, the SGA amount has been adjusted annually in line with the national average wage index.  
  6of the program attain a higher level of utility by reducing labor supply to hours=HSGA.  It is not 
obvious, however, how many disabled individuals would be able to work hours>HSGA in the 
absence of the program.  
The emphasis of recent policy reforms has been on offering employment services to DI 
participants.  The Ticket to Work Program, established in 1999 under the Ticket to Work 
Incentive and Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA) makes available a voucher (or 
“ticket”) that can be used to obtain vocational rehabilitation and employment services within an 
approved network of public and private providers.
8  The program was phased in between 2001 
and 2004.
9  The TWWIIA also extended Medicare coverage to beneficiaries who return to work 
by offering them continuation of premium-free Medicare Part A for 93 months after the end of 
the Trial Work Period and the option to purchase Medicare Part B. 
2.2 DI Interaction with OASI at Full Retirement Age 
Once a DI beneficiary reaches full retirement age, his benefits automatically convert to 
Social Security retirement benefits.  The benefit amount itself does not change; but the terms 
governing receipt of the benefit do change—the DI work rules are abruptly relaxed, and the rules 
governing the Social Security earnings test become binding.  Prior to 2000, the earnings test 
amounted to an implicit marginal tax of 50 percent on earnings above an exempt threshold
10; 
after 2000, the earnings test was eliminated for OASI beneficiaries above their full retirement 
age (but retained for those between early retirement age and full retirement age).  In terms of the 
                                                 
8 According to a report by Mathematica (2007), the participation rate in the Ticket to Work program in the early 
implementing states has been much lower than anticipated (1.4 percent).  This is more likely a reflection of 
documented implementation difficulties than an indication of very low residual work capacity among DI 
beneficiaries. 
9 New regulations in 2008 aim to expand ticket eligibility, attract more service providers, and expand the range of 
rehabilitation and employment services offered.   
10 The exempt threshold has varied over time. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/rtea.html. 
 
  7budget constraint depicted in Figure 1, the transition at FRA amounts to an abrupt upward shift 
in the line segment DE such that it connects directly with point C.  Prior to 2000, the slope of the 
line segment flattened at the hours threshold associated with the OASI earnings test exempt 
amount (which was generally a bit higher than the SGA threshold); after 2000 there was no slope 
change at all and segment DE became an extension of BC.   
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data 
 
We use the first eight waves of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, which 
cover the period 1992-2006 in a sequence of biennial interviews.  We restrict our analysis sample 
to HRS respondents who attain their Social Security full retirement age (FRA) at any point after 
their baseline interview and before their last interview.
11  Ninety percent of the sample belongs 
to the original HRS cohort (b. 1931-1941) and 10 percent come from the CODA cohort (b. 192
1930).  Seventy-three percent of the sample has an FRA of 65, 10 percent has an FRA of 65 and 
2 months, 9 percent has an FRA of 65 and 4 months, and 8 percent have an FRA of 65 and 6 
months. The sample consists of 57,928 person-wave observations contributed by 7,241 unique 
individuals.  Of this group, 9.3 percent (670 respondents) report participation in the DI program 
in the wave prior to attaining their FRA, that is, at ages 63-64.
7-
                                                
12  Over the course of the study 
period, these 670 individuals contribute 5,360 person-wave observations. 
In the HRS, DI participation is measured in two ways, by self-report and matched SSA 
administrative records. The administrative match rate is quite low (just 47.8 percent of our 
sample has a matched record) and therefore we make use of the self-reported data. A limitation 
of the self-reported variable is that the question wording changed over time; the survey question 
 
11 Respondents who attrit from the HRS after attaining their FRA are retained in the sample. 
12 Because the HRS is a biennial survey, most individuals who were 63-64 in one wave attained full retirement age 
by the next wave. 
  8grouped DI and SSI together in waves 1-4, but asked about the programs separately in waves 5-
8.  We address this limitation by combining DI and SSI in the later waves so that we have a 
consistent measure of combined DI-SSI participation over time.  Since we are primarily 
interested in DI participation, this induces measurement error in our dependent variable; 
however, the problem is slightly mitigated by the overlap in the DI and SSI populations (14-16 
percent of DI beneficiaries also participate in SSI (Social Security Administration, 2008)) and 
the fact that the SSI program has similar work disincentives.  Comparing self-reported 
participation with the administrative data among the subgroup of matched respondents in our 
sample suggests that the inclusion of SSI adds about 1-2 percentage points to our measured DI 
participation rate.  
Table 1 presents pre-period descriptive statistics for the sample of individuals on DI at 
ages 63-64 and those not on DI at ages 63-64.  All statistics are measured as of the wave prior to 
attaining full retirement age.  By construction, the mean ages are nearly identical (63.5 v. 63.6), 
and the full retirement age of the median individual in both groups is 65.  As expected, the DI 
sample is worse off in terms of socioeconomic status and health.  DI beneficiaries are 
disproportionately black, have fewer years of schooling, are less likely to be married, have less 
than half the net worth
13 of non-DI participants, and are less healthy on all 13 measures of health 
status. They have higher SSA income (i.e., income from DI, SSI, and OA), reflecting the facts 
that DI participants receive DI benefits based on their full primary insurance amount (PIA) while 
many of those not on DI have not yet claimed SSA retirement benefits, and those who have 
claimed have received actuarial reductions for early claiming. They are also more likely to have 
                                                 
13 Net worth is the sum of assets (primary residence, other real estate, vehicles, businesses, IRAs, stocks, bonds, 
checking accounts, CDs, and other assets) less liabilities (mortgages, other home loans, and other debt).   
  9health insurance coverage, due to the fact that Medicare becomes available to DI participants 
after a waiting period of 24 months.  
3.2 Quasi-Experimental Design 
In our quasi-experimental research design we take a DI participant attaining full 
retirement age to be an “instrument” for the abrupt relaxation of the DI work disincentives.   We 
use a difference-in-differences (DD) estimator, where the first difference is between labor force 
participation before and after full retirement age and the second difference is between DI 
participants (the “treatment” group) and non-DI participants (the comparison group).
14  Because 
we have panel data, we take the within-individual change in labor force participation before and 
after attainment of full retirement age. This is desirable as it guarantees comparability of the 
groups in the pre- and post-periods, controlling for any compositional changes due to attrition or 
sampling variation.   
The identifying assumption in DD models is that other time-varying processes would 
have similarly impacted the treatment and comparison groups.  The pre-period differences 
between the groups in Table 1 suggest a potential vulnerability on this front (Meyer, 1995).  We 
address this by testing for differential changes in a number of potential confounders, including 
health status, health insurance coverage, and non-labor income.  We then present in addition to 
unadjusted DD estimates, estimates that account for within-individual changes in these and other 
relevant variables.  
4. Labor Supply Response of DI Recipients at Full Retirement Age 
4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
 
                                                 
14 An alternative approach is to use a regression-discontinuity estimator comparing the labor supply behavior of 
disabled individuals just before and just after attainment of their full retirement age; however, because such 
estimators require a large number of observations in a “small enough” window on either side of the full retirement 
age, we do not have enough observations in the HRS to make such a design feasible. 
  10Figure 2 shows labor force participation by age for DI recipients on the left axis and self-
reported DI program participation by age on the right axis. Self-reported DI participation drops 
from just over 9 percent prior to age 65 (the full retirement age for most of the sample), to about 
7 percent at ages 65-66 and just under 5 percent at 67-68.  In theory, DI participation rates should 
drop to zero at ages 65-66, since DI beneficiaries are automatically transferred to the SSA 
retirement program at their full retirement age; however, the gradual decline in self-reported 
participation shown in the figure likely reflects two factors:  first, as noted above our measure of 
DI participation includes SSI participation, and some individuals may continue to be eligible for 
SSI once they reach FRA. A second possibility is that some respondents do not immediately 
realize that they are no longer on DI.  If so, they may be unaware of the change in program rules, 
which should bias down the estimated effect on labor supply.  Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows a 
distinct rise in the labor force participation of DI participants as they attain their full retirement 
age.  In the period prior to FRA (at ages 63-64), 4.5 percent are working, whereas in the period 
after FRA (at ages 65-66) 6.1 percent are working. The rise in labor force participation persists 
(and perhaps even rises a bit further) until at least ages 69-70.  This pattern is particularly 
dramatic in light of the declining trend in labor force participation with age in the non-DI 
population.  Figure 4 illustrates this stark difference, showing the labor force participation rate 
for DI recipients on the left axis, and that for non-DI recipients on the right axis.  Among non-DI 
recipients, the percent working for pay falls from 45.0 percent at 63-64 to 35.7 percent at 65-66.  
Table 2 shows that the DD estimate implied by Figure 4 is 0.109. The estimate is identical 
whether based on differenced group means or means of within-individual differences.  Also 
notable is the precipitously declining pre-period trend in labor force participation among those 
receiving DI at 63-64.  Most were already receiving DI prior to ages 63-64, but some were not 
  11and the drop in labor force participation reflects the gradual movement of this group out of the 
labor force and onto DI (note that in Figure 2 the DI participation rate rises substantially between 
ages 59 and 64).  In sum, pre-period trends in labor force participation in both the treatment 
group and comparison group were declining, making the rise in labor force participation by DI 
participants at full retirement age all the more notable. 
  Figure 4 shows the age profiles in labor force participation for the two groups split 
according to whether full retirement age was attained before or after 2002.  Most of the policy 
changes described in Section 2 took effect after our sample was interviewed in 2000; therefore 
2002 is the first HRS survey year in which we could potentially detect differences associated 
with these policy changes.
15   Within both groups, labor force participation rates between ages 
59-62 are the same, but by ages 63-64 labor force participation is higher among the subgroups 
attaining their FRA after 2002. The decline in labor force participation at FRA for non-DI 
participants is similar before and after 2002, but the rise in labor force participation at FRA for 
DI participants appears to be greater. This pattern is consistent with a dose-response relationship 
between the size of the reduction in the work disincentive and the size of the rise in labor 
supply—prior to 2000 the DI work disincentives were partially eliminated at FRA, whereas after 
2000, the DI work disincentives were completely eliminated at FRA.
16  
Another intriguing aspect of Figure 4 is the greater labor force participation of DI 
participants in the period prior to FRA; this raises the possibility that the policy changes aimed at 
improving work incentives during this period (including the initiation of the Ticket to Work 
                                                 
15 Nearly half (48%) of the HRS cohort had their Wave 5 interview before or during April 2000, when the Senior 
Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act was signed into law. 
16 Although we interpret the relative rise in LFP after 2002 as being a result of the removal of the Social Security 
earnings test, it may also reflect the effect of the TWWIIA if those who participated in the Ticket to Work program 
while on DI later benefited from the access to employment services and networks.  Given the low early participation 
rate in Ticket to Work program any such effect is likely to be small. 
  12program) may have had detectable effects.  Of course, labor force participation in the period 
prior to FRA is also higher among non-DI participants, so careful analysis of alternative 
explanations (such as birth cohort effects) is necessary before any conclusions may be drawn 
about the effects of these policies on individuals while enrolled in DI.  
4.2 Models 
 
Let  denote the change in labor supply outcome  for individual   in 
treatment group   between time t and t-2; 
ijt Y Δ Y 1,..., iN =
1, 2 j = ijt X Δ  is the change in individual characteristics 
between time t and t-2;   is an indicator for being in the treatment group; and  j D ijt ε is an 
individual-specific error term.  We begin with a two-period model in which t-2 denotes the pre-
period and t the post-period, and we estimate a linear equation of the following form: 
ijt j ijt ijt YD X α βπ Δ= + + Δ + ε         ( 1 )  
In this two-period pre/post model, the coefficientβ  is the DD estimate of the effect of relaxing 
the DI work disincentive and α captures a linear time trend in . We also expand the 
specification beyond the simple two-period pre-/post- comparison to allow multiple pre- and 
post-periods.  In Figure 4, we saw that the shape of the age profile is different for the treatment 
and comparison groups; thus we interact a flexible function of t with the treatment group 
indicator   in order to allow the slopes of the age profile to differ before and after full 
retirement age and across groups.   
ijt Y
j D
() *( ) ( ) ijt j j ijt ijt YD D f t f t X β δφπ Δ= + + + Δ + ε      (2) 
We model  ( ) f t  as a sequence of dummy variables for each period t.  If we set the reference 
period to be the first post-period, then the coefficientβ  continues to be the DD estimate. 
  4.3 Potential Confounders  
  13  An attraction of the first-differenced model shown in (1) and (2) is that permanent 
unobservable differences between DI beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are differenced out.  
This is desirable in light of the many differences between the two groups shown in Table 1.  
However, the existence of pre-period differences also suggests that time-varying processes may 
differentially impact the two groups (Meyer, 1995).  In particular, health shocks might 
differentially impact the DI group given their lower initial health status. Another domain of 
vulnerability are changes associated with attaining full retirement age.  For example, given that 
most DI beneficiaries already qualify for Medicare, we would expect only a modest rise in health 
insurance coverage among this group as those who entered DI at or after age 63 qualify for 
Medicare at 65.  On the other hand, we expect a larger rise in health insurance coverage for the 
non-DI group as the uninsured gain health insurance coverage through Medicare at age 65.  
Similarly, although DI benefits are converted to SSA retirement benefits at full retirement age, 
the benefit amount itself does not change.  On the other hand, many non-DI beneficiaries claim 
OASI retirement benefits at full retirement age, although the majority (on average 68% between 
1992 to 2006)
17 claim OASI benefits before FRA.   
One way of testing for the presence of confounders is to estimate models like those in 
equations (1) or (2) for each potential confounder.
18  Table 3 shows DD estimates based on 
equation (1) for 22 potential confounders, including household size, financial variables, health 
insurance coverage, and many measures of health status.  The estimation sample has one first-
differenced observation per respondent.  Statistically significant estimates are evidence that the 
treatment group experienced differential pre-/post-FRA changes in a given variable.  There is 
little evidence of differential impacts for pre-/post-FRA changes in household size, net worth, 
                                                 
17 Authors’ calculation according to the Social Security Annual Statistical Supplement 2007 Table 6.B5. 
18 This is similar in spirit the test offered by Lee (2008) in the context of regression discontinuity designs. 
  14capital income, private pension income, income received from SSA (including DI and OA 
retirement income), other government transfer income, and other income (this latter category 
includes, for example, lump sum amounts received from private pensions).  On the other hand 
the coefficient in column (8) indicates that the control group experienced a large differential 
change in health insurance coverage at FRA. As noted earlier, this captures enrollment of 
uninsured non-DI beneficiaries in Medicare at age 65, which for birth cohorts in our sample 
occurs either exactly at or within the six months prior to attaining full retirement age.   There are 
also differential changes in several measures of health status, though the effects often run in 
opposite directions.  For example, column (9) indicates that the control group experienced a 
greater increase in the probability of reporting fair or poor health and greater onset of arthritis, 
but the treatment group saw greater increases in the numbers of activity limitations (ADLs and 
IADLs) and the total number of health conditions reported, specifically diabetes, heart disease, 
stroke, and mental health problems.  On balance, these results suggest that the treatment group 
became relatively less healthy at FRA, which would tend to work against detection of a labor 
supply response at FRA; on the other hand, the large relative rise in health insurance coverage 
for the control group might inflate the labor supply response of DI participants as the control 
group reduces labor supply in response to the gain in insurance coverage.   
To control for these important time-varying processes, we follow two approaches.  The 
first is to simply include these variables in first-differences in the vector  ijt X Δ  in equations (1) 
and (2).  However, this specification assumes that these factors had the same effect on the 
treatment group as the comparison group, and the evidence in Table 3 raises the possibility of 
differential effects.  Our second approach involves fully interacting the first-differenced 
confounding variables with the treatment dummy as follows: 
  15() ( ) *( ) ( ) * ijt j j j ijt ijt ijt YD D f t f t DX X β δφ ϕπ Δ= + + + Δ + Δ + ε    (3) 
This fully interacted model is equivalent to running separate models for the treatment and control 
groups, each with the full set of control variables, and differencing the estimated within-group 
effects of attaining the FRA on labor supply to obtain β . 
4.4 Results 
  Table 4 presents several OLS specifications of equation (1), which contrasts pre-/post-
FRA changes in labor supply for the treatment and comparison groups.  The estimation sample 
has one first-differenced observation per respondent.  Our main focus is the extensive labor 
supply margin—working for pay; however, we will also present models for several intensive 
margin outcomes, including earnings, hours worked per week and weeks worked per year.  To 
illustrate the impact of controlling for the potential confounders shown in Table 3, we enter the 
ijt X Δ  variables sequentially in groups.  Column (1) shows the unadjusted DD estimate ofβ  from 
Table 2 for reference (0.109).  In column (2) we add first-differenced demographic variables 
(household size and an indicator for being married) and financial variables (net worth, capital 
income, private pension income, SSA income, other government transfer income, and other 
income).  The DD estimate ofβ  declines slightly, to 0.100.  Among the control variables, only 
the married indicator, net worth, and SSA income are themselves statistically significant (not 
shown), indicating that positive changes in net worth and SSA income as well as entering 
marriage are associated with reductions in labor supply.  In column (3) we add the extensive set 
of first-differenced health controls listed in Tables 1 and 3.  Again, the DD estimate ofβ  hardly 
changes; only the fair/poor health indicator is statistically significant (not shown), indicating that 
entering fair/poor health is associated with a reduction in labor supply.  Column (4) adds changes 
in health insurance coverage.  In this case, the DD estimate of β  reverts back to 0.109 (0.013).    
  16In column (5) we interact all covariates with the treatment dummy and the estimate of β  falls 
slightly to 0.090.  Finally, in column (6) we use multiple pre- and post- periods as well as fully 
interacted covariates, as shown in equation (3), and the estimate of β rises to 0.104 ((0.012). 
In all of these first-differenced specifications, we calculate the standard errors allowing for 
arbitrary correlation in the labor supply within the treatment and control groups in a given year.  
For the two-period models shown in columns (1)-(5) we use calendar years and obtain 22 group-
calendar year clusters.  In the multi-period model shown in column (6) we cluster by treatment 
group and time period relative to FRA, which gives 6 periods*2 groups=12 clusters. 
In Table 5, we examine whether the estimated treatment effect differs for individuals who 
attained FRA before and after 2002.  The DD estimate of β  (based on equation (3)) is 0.089 
before 2002 and 0.128 in 2002 or later. Although the two coefficients are not statistically 
different ( ), the substantial rise after 2002 is suggestive of a dose-response relationship 
between labor force participation and the magnitude of work disincentives. For comparison, 
Song and Manchester (2007) found that work participation among OASI beneficiaries ages 65-
69 increased by one to two percentage points after the removal of earnings test.  Our implied 
point estimate for DI beneficiaries is higher (3.9 percentage points), but not statistically different 
from zero. 
1.3 t =−
  Finally, we test for labor supply effects in other related outcomes, notably hours worked 
per week, the percent working full-time, weeks worked per year, the percent working full-year, 
earnings, and the percent with earned income above the SGA threshold.  Estimating equation (3) 
for each outcome, Table 6 shows consistent evidence of a treatment effect across outcomes.  
  17Hours per week rose by 4.3 hours
19 (compared to an unconditional mean of 1.1 hours per week 
among DI participants in the period before FRA); the percent working full-time rose by 8.0 
percentage points (on a base of 1.6 percent); weeks per year rose by 5.1 weeks (on a base of 1.6 
weeks); the percent working full-year (>=50 weeks per year) rose by 8.8 percentage points (on a 
base of 2.4 percent); annual earnings rose by $3,006 (on a base of $755), and the percent with 
earnings above the SGA threshold rose by 7.2 percentage points (on a base of 2.5 percent).  
Comparing this last figure to our estimated 10.4 percent increase in the percent working indicates 
that about 70 percent of the rise in labor force participation at full retirement age was to earnings 
levels above SSA’s threshold for substantial gainful activity. 
Finally, we also tested whether the labor supply response varies across individuals with 
different kinds of health conditions.  We found suggestive evidence that the labor supply 
response was greater among those who were relatively healthier (for example, those with no 
activity limitations compared to those one or more), but a positive labor supply effect persisted 
even in subsamples of relatively less healthy individuals.  This suggests that initiatives to 
improve the DI work incentives need not be targeted at only the healthiest respondents.  
5. Conclusion 
Our results suggest that even the oldest DI recipients respond to changes in work 
incentives, and underscore the existence of untapped work capacity among even the oldest DI 
beneficiaries.   The effects we document are large increases in percent terms; however, they do 
not suggest that all or even most DI beneficiaries can or would work.  Our adjusted difference-
in-difference (DD) estimates imply a 10.4 percentage point rise in labor force participation at full 
retirement age among former DI participants relative to non-DI participants.  There is weak 
                                                 
19 Our estimate of the change in hours corresponds to roughly 25 hours per month, which is somewhat lower than 
Chen and van der Klaauw’s (2008) estimate of 30 hours per month. 
  18evidence that the labor supply response was stronger after elimination of the Social Security 
earnings test, which suggests the existence of a dose-response relationship between the size of 
the work disincentive and labor supply.  We also document corresponding increases in related 
measures of labor supply including hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, annual 
earnings, and the percent earning above SSA’s threshold for substantial gainful activity.  Given 
that we have identified a labor supply response among those DI beneficiaries arguably least 
likely to work, we present our estimates as a lower bound on the work capacity of DI 
beneficiaries.  Combining our estimates with recent work establishing an upper bound on the 
work capacity of DI beneficiaries (Chen and van der Klaauw 2008) suggests that the DI program 
causes a modest 10-20 percentage point reduction in labor force participation. 
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  24Table 1. Sample Means as of Wave Prior to Full Retirement Age by DI Status
On DI at 63-64 Not on DI at 63-64
Current Age 63.5 63.6





Years of Schooling 10.4 12.3
Household Size 2.4 2.3
Married 0.65 0.76
Earnings ($) 755                          16,087                     
Net Worth ($) 185,220                   444,856                   
Capital Income ($) 3,903                       17,455                     
Private Pension Income ($) 2,638                       5,315                       
SSA Income (Incl. DI, SSI, and Retirement Income) ($) 8,825                       5,762                       
Other Government Transfer Income ($) 628                          734                          
Other Income ($) 1,066                       2,885                       
Any Health Insurance Coverage 0.92 0.70                         
Fair or Poor Self-Reported Health (0-1) 0.73 0.21
Number of ADL Limitations 0.8 0.2
Number of IADL Limitations 0.2 0.1
Ever Had High Blood Pressure 0.62 0.45
Ever Had Diabetes 0.27 0.14
Ever Had Cancer 0.12 0.09
Ever Had Lung Disease 0.22 0.07
Ever Had Heart Disease 0.38 0.16
Ever Had Stroke 0.15 0.04
Ever Had Psychiatric Problems 0.29 0.09
Ever Had Arthritis 0.73 0.51
Number of Major Health Conditions 2.8 1.6
Body Mass Index (BMI) 28.8 27.6
N 670 6571
Notes: Net worth is the sum of assets (primary residence, other real estate, vehicles, businesses, IRAs, stocks, bonds, 
checking accounts, CDs, and other assets) less liabilities (mortgages, other home loans, and other debt).  ADL refers to 
Activities of Daily Living and IADL to Instrumental Activities of Daily Living.  Major Health Conditions include 1) high blood 
pressure or hypertension; 2) diabetes or high blood sugar; 3) cancer or a malignant tumor of any kind except skin cancer; 4) 
chronic lung disease except asthma such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema; 5) heart attack, coronary heart disease, 
angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart problems; 6) stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA); 7) emotional, nervous, 
or psychiatric problems; and 8)arthritis or rheumatism.  All dollar amounts in $2006.Table 2. Employment Rate Before and After FRA for DI Beneficiaries versus Non-Beneficiaries
Wave Wave Across Group Within-Individual
Before FRA After FRA Change Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On DI 0.045 0.061 0.016 0.016
(0.015) (0.011)
Not on DI 0.450 0.357 -0.093 -0.093
(0.006) (0.005)
DD Estimate of Treatment Effect 0.109 0.109
(0.016) (0.012)
Note: Standard errors clustered by treatment group and calendar year.  DI participation is measured as of the 
Wave before FRA (ages 63-64). Col 3 is Col 2 minus Col 1.  Col 4 is mean within-individual after-minus-before 
change in employment rate.Table 3. Tests for Differential Pre-/Post Changes in Potential Confounders for Treatment versus Comparison Groups
ΔHousehold ΔNet ΔCapital ΔPension ΔSSA ΔOth Gov ΔOther ΔAny ΔFair/Poor ΔTotal ΔTotal
Size Worth Income Income Income Xfer Inc Income Health Ins Health ADLs IADLs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
0.033 -55.26 0.729 -0.693 -0.038 0.023 -0.453 -0.203** -0.041 0.121* 0.087**
(0.030) (34.007) (1.076) (0.359) (0.483) (0.076) (0.580) (0.019) (0.038) (0.057) (0.027)
No. Obs 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7234 6930
ΔCESD Onset Onset Onset Onset Onset Onset Onset Onset ΔTotal
Scale HBP Diabetes Cancer Lung Dis Heart Dis Stroke Psych Arthritis Conditions ΔBMI
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
-0.102 -0.005 0.020** 0.005 0.003 0.018 0.023* 0.011 -0.024** 0.050* -0.132
(0.103) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.023) (0.107)
No. Obs 6282 7234 7225 7217 7230 7229 7234 7227 7225 7241 7110
j D
j D
Notes: Columns are separate regressions based on Equation (1) for first-differenced dependent variable listed in column head, where differences are taken 
between the wave just after FRA and the wave just before FRA.  D j is a dummy  for being on DI in the wave just before FRA (at ages 63-64), and thus its 
coefficient measures the relative change in the dependent variable for the group on DI relative to individuals not on DI.  Data are from the Health and Retirement
Study, 1992-2006.  Loss in sample size for IADL and CESD variables is from dropping  Wave 1 responses because of incomparable survey questions. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by treatment group and calendar year.  *denotes 5% significance and  ** indicates 1% significance.  HBP stands for High 
Blood Pressure.Table 4. Adjusted DD Estimates of Effect of Relaxing DI Work Disincentive on Employment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.109** 0.100** 0.102** 0.109** 0.090** 0.104**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
ΔDemographics XXXX X
ΔNet Worth and ΔIncome XXXX X
ΔHealth Status X X X X
ΔHealth Insurance Coverage X X X
Covariates Fully Interacted with Treatment X X
Multiple Pre-/Post Periods X
No. Obs 7229 7229 6731 6731 6731 29611
j D
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) are separate regressions based on Equation (1) for first-differenced working for pay, where differences are 
taken between the wave just after FRA and the wave just before FRA.  Column (6) is based on Equation (2) for first-differenced working
for pay, where wave-to-wave differences are taken across three waves prior to FRA and three waves afer FRA.  D j is a dummy  for 
being on DI in the wave just before FRA (at ages 63-64).  Data are from the Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2006.  Demographic 
variables include household size and an indicator if married.  Income variables include capital income, private pension income, SSA 
income, other government transfer income, and other income.  Health Status variables include all health variable listed in Table 1. Loss 
in sample size in columns (3),  (4), and (5) is from dropping  Wave 1 responses because of incomparable survey questions on IADL 
items.  Standard errors ( in parentheses) for two-period models shown columns (1)-(5) are clustered by treatment group and calendar 
year (22 clusters), while standard errors for multi-period model in column (6) are clustered by treatment group and time period relative 
to FRA (12 clusters).  *denotes 5% significance and  ** indicates 1% significance.Table 5. Adjusted DD Estimates of Effect of Relaxing DI Work Disincentive
on Employment Rate, Before and After 2002
Turn FRA Turn FRA





ΔNet Worth and ΔIncome X X
ΔHealth Status X X
ΔHealth Insurance Coverage X X
Covariates Fully Interacted with Treatment X X
Multiple Pre-/Post Periods X X
No. Obs 18305 11306
j D
Notes: Columns are separate regressions based on Equation (2) for first-differenced working 
for pay, where wave-to-wave differences are taken across three waves prior to FRA and three 
waves after FRA, and where all (first-differenced) covariates are fully interacted with the 
treatment dummy, D j (being on DI in the wave just before FRA).  Data are from the Health and 
Retirement Study, 1992-2006. Demographic variables include household size and an indicator 
if married.  Income variables include capital income, private pension income, SSA income, 
other government transfer income, and other income.  Health Status variables include health 
variables listed in Table 1.  Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by treatment group 
and time period relative to FRA (6 periods*2 groups=12 clusters).  *denotes 5% significance 
and  ** indicates 1% significance.Table 6. Adjusted DD Estimates of Effect of Relaxing DI Work Disincentive on Hours, Weeks, and Earnings
ΔHours per  ΔWeeks per ΔWorks ΔWorks ΔAnnual Δ(Earnings>=
Week Year Full-Time Full-Year Earnings SGA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4.288** 5.093** 0.080** 0.088** 3,005.699** 0.072**
(0.414) (0.479) (0.008) (0.009) (416.312) (0.009)
ΔDemographics X XXXXX
ΔNet Worth and ΔIncome X XXXXX
ΔHealth Status X XXXXX
ΔHealth Insurance Coverage X XXXXX
Covariates Fully Interacted with Treatment X XXXXX
Multiple Pre-/Post Periods X XXXXX
Mean for DI Participants at 63-64 1.135 1.603 0.016 0.024 754.518 0.025
No. Obs 29083 28976 29611 29611 29642 29642
j D
Notes: Columns are separate regressions based on Equation (2) for first-differenced variable in column head, where wave-to-wave differences are 
taken across three waves prior to FRA and three waves after FRA, and where all (first-differenced) covariates are fully interacted with the treatment 
dummy, Dj (being on DI in the wave just before FRA).  Working Full-Time is hours per week >=35 and Working Full-Year is weeks per year >=50.  Data 
are from the Health and Retirement Study, 1992-2006.  Demographic variables include household size and an indicator if married.  Income variables 
include capital income, private pension income, SSA income, other government transfer income, and other income.  Health Status variables include  
health variables listed in Table 1.  Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by treatment group and time period relative to FRA (6 periods*2 
groups=12 clusters).  *denotes 5% significance and  ** indicates 1% significance.